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Abstract
Only in last decade or two have political scientists begun sys tematic, cross-national research on government
violations of human rights. The primary research focus has been the rights associ ated with the "integrity of the
person." At least two factors account for this relatively recent attention: the interest of President Jimmy Carter
and Congress in setting human rights as a goal of American foreign policy and the publication of country-by-
country accounts of human rights performance by the U.S. Department of State, Amnesty Inter national, and
Freedom House. As the issue rose on the political agenda and as data sources for large cross-national analyses
became available, scholarly interest quickly developed.1 In this sense, human rights re search has been driven
as much by policy priorities and data availability as by theory.
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 Research Note
 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS,
 UMBRELLA CONCEPTS, AND
 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
 By JAMES M. MCCORMICK and NEIL J. MITCHELL*
 ONLY in the last decade or two have political scientists begun sys
 tematic, cross-national research on government violations of
 human rights. The primary research focus has been the rights associ
 ated with the "integrity of the person." At least two factors account for
 this relatively recent attention: the interest of President Jimmy Carter
 and Congress in setting human rights as a goal of American foreign
 policy and the publication of country-by-country accounts of human
 rights performance by the U.S. Department of State, Amnesty Inter
 national, and Freedom House. As the issue rose on the political agenda
 and as data sources for large cross-national analyses became available,
 scholarly interest quickly developed.1 In this sense, human rights re
 search has been driven as much by policy priorities and data availability
 as by theory.
 Recent empirical work reflects both the strengths and the weak
 nesses of this sort of approach to social science analysis. Consider the
 research by Steven Poe and C. Neal T?te, who conducted the most am
 bitious recent empirical analysis of human rights violations. As they
 rightly note, "The data set we employ clearly represents the most com
 prehensive yet analyzed."2 Indeed, by building on the pioneering work
 of Carleton and Stohl, they collected annual data on human rights vio
 * Thanks are due to Kathy Shelley for assistance with the data preparation for this study and to
 Mack Shelley and Wendy Hansen for assistance with several statistical questions
 1 See, for example, David Carleton and Michael Stohl, "The Foreign Policy of Human Rights:
 Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, " Human Rights Quarterly 7 (May 1985);
 and Neil J. Mitchell and James M. McCormick, "Economic and Political Explanations of Human
 Rights Violations," World Politics 40 (July 1988).
 2 Poe and T?te, "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analy
 sis," American Political Science Review 88 (December 1994), 853.
 World Politics 49 (July 1997), 510-25
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 lations for 153 countries over an eight-year period, and, using a cross
 sectional, time-series design, they examined the relative impact of sev
 eral independent variables, drawn largely from the extant literature. In
 turn, they reached a number of conclusions, for example, about the role
 of democracy in reducing human rights violations and about the role of
 international and domestic threats in exacerbating them.3 Their work
 represents an advance in terms of quantity of data analyzed, method
 ological sophistication, and the number of independent variables in
 cluded in the analysis.
 For all that this is an advance, however, we do have reservations
 about this and related analyses in terms of their tendency to treat a
 multidimensional concept unidimensionally.4 In line with the develop
 ments in other areas of the discipline, we believe that theoretical and pol
 icy progress in the human rights area depends on recognizing the separate
 dimensions of the concept "repression of human rights to personal in
 tegrity."5 Indeed, recognizing the dimensions of concepts is a well-estab
 lished principle in the comparative methodology literature, and the
 theoretical and empirical maturation of research in other areas of the
 discipline has depended on this recognition. The argument of this re
 search note is a theoretical and methodological one that hinges on the
 problems of information loss and missed analytical opportunities arising
 from the failure to disaggregate the concept appropriately. In addition, in
 the second part of this research note, we illustrate these problems with
 some cross-national human rights data from the 1980s. We demonstrate
 both conceptually and empirically that unidimensional treatment of
 human rights confounds two important components of the concept?
 the use of imprisonment and the use of torture and killing?and gen
 erally produces a measure closer to the latter than to the former. Future
 research needs to recognize the detrimental normative and analytical
 consequences of a unidimensional treatment of the human rights con
 cept and should analyze its important components separately.
 Human Rights Violations: A Multidimensional Concept
 More than two decades ago Ivan Vallier stressed the importance of "ex
 tricating the implied dimensions" of "master concepts," such as "mod
 3 Ibid., 866-67.
 4 See Carleton and Stohl (fn. 1); David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E. Pasquarello, "Human Rights
 Practices and the Distribution of Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries," American Journal of Po
 litical Science 29 (August 1985); and Conway Henderson, "Conditions Affecting the Use of Political
 Repression," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (March 1991).
 5 Poe and T?te (fn. 2), 853.
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 ernization." Vallier described the procedure as "disaggregating a con
 cept or the exhausting of its analytical components."6 In a similar vein
 Robert Jackman revisited this same issue about a decade ago and put
 the concern more direcdy:
 [ Variables are supposed to be unidimensional. While this may seem rudimen
 tary, the literature on comparative politics is replete with umbrella concepts that
 carry too much baggage to be reducible to a single unidimensional variable. Ex
 amples of such broad concepts include system support, political culture, mod
 ernization, democratic stability, mobilization, political institutionalization, and
 post-industrialism. Instead of identifying a potentially unidimensional variable,
 each of these concepts identifies a broad constellation of factors, which may or
 may not be empirically inter-related ... it is important to focus on their separate
 components if we are to make meaningful empirical statements about these
 problem areas.7
 In our judgment, repression of human rights should be added to the list
 of master, or umbrella, concepts.
 Before discussing the dimensions of this concept, let us focus more
 generally on the possible empirical and theoretical dividends of sepa
 rating out the components of a concept. Research on human rights
 views the individual as a subject of political control in her or his rela
 tionship to government. Consider, however, the individual in the role
 of citizen and politicalparticipant. A critical step in the analysis of indi
 vidual participation in the political process is the recognition that "po
 litical participation" as a concept is not unidimensional. To be sure, in
 early research, participation "was considered to be a unidimensional
 phenomenon. The main distinction across political actors was the ex
 tent of their activeness'?essentially how much effort they put into po
 litical participation."8 Yet Verba, Nie, and Kim also argued that the
 conceptualization must reflect, not only level of activity, but also type
 of activity. That is, political participation includes voting, campaign ac
 tivity, citizen-initiated contacting, and cooperative activity. They agued
 that "the failure to distinguish among types of participation is ... in
 large part responsible for many of the ambiguities in the findings about
 participation and its role in democracies?what causes it to increase or
 decrease, how it affects the allocation of social values, and so forth."9
 6 Vallier, "Empirical Comparisons of Social Structure: Leads and Lags," in Vallier, ed., Comparative
 Methods in Sociology (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), 223.
 7 Robert Jackman, "Cross-National Statistical Research and the Study of Comparative Politics,"
 American Journal of Political Science 29 (February 1985), 169, emphasis in original.
 8 Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven
 Nation Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 52.
 9 Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross
 National Comparison (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), 8.
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 Theoretically, the disaggregation of the concept led to the progressive
 realization that the different actions fit different structures of motiva
 tions, opportunities, and resources. In the case of participation, voting
 is a lower cost, "broad" benefit activity. In contrast, contacting is a
 higher cost, "narrow" benefit activity10
 The development of the political participation concept, then, is
 highly suggestive for the concept of human rights violations, where in
 dividuals are the subjects of political control. However, the dominant
 approach in empirical work on human rights violations is to treat the
 concept unidimensionally. Advocating this approach, Poe and T?te say:
 "We believe that it can be persuasively argued that the two dimensions
 postulated by Mitchell and McCormick stem, in reality, from the one
 dimension that Stohl and his colleagues tap?that both torture/killing
 and imprisonment are rooted in a regime's willingness to repress its cit
 izens when they are considered a threat."11 One can have no great quar
 rel with the statement about the "roots" of repression?any more than
 Verba, Nie, and Kim would quarrel with a statement that participation
 is "rooted" in the citizen's willingness to influence his or her govern
 ment. Nevertheless, that view does not provide a persuasive rationale
 for aggregating data on imprisonment and torture/killing (or for that
 matter, data on voting, campaign activity, citizen contacting, and coop
 erative activity) in the same conceptual container.
 Instead, we contend that human rights violations differ in type not just
 amount, such that they cannot be clearly represented on a single scale.
 That is, there is a substantive difference between the use of imprison
 ment on the one hand and the use of torture and killing on the other.12
 Substantively, these are quite different types of government activity, with
 differing consequences for the victims, differing use of governmental re
 sources and capabilities, and differing costs for the government, both
 domestically and internationally. Normatively, too, there is a consider
 able distance between a regime that relies on imprisonment as a
 method of political control and one that relies on torture and killing.
 This normative distinction provides a basis for arguments about the
 universal as opposed to culturally relative nature of human rights and
 even about the interpretation of international law concerning human
 rights. Bilahari Kausikan,an official in Singapore's Ministry of Foreign
 10 See Jan E. Leighley, "Field Essay: Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Po
 litical Participation," Political Research Quarterly 48 (March 1995), 182. See also John Aldrich, "Ratio
 nal Choice and Turnout," American Journal of Political Science 37 (February 1993).
 11 Poe and T?te (fn. 2), 855.
 12 In fact, the logic of the argument would extend to disaggregating torture from killing as a third
 dimension.
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 Affairs, argues that the "myth of the universality of all human rights is
 harmful if it masks the real gap that exists between Asian and Western
 perceptions of human rights,"13 and he asserts that
 future Western approaches on human rights will have to be formulated with
 greater nuance and precision. It makes a great deal of difference if the West in
 sists on humane standards of behavior by vigorously protesting genocide, mur
 der, torture, or slavery. Here there is a clear consensus on a core international
 law that does not admit derogation on any grounds. The West has a legitimate
 right and moral duty to promote those core human rights.... But if the West
 objects to, say, capital punishment, detention without trial, or curbs on press
 freedoms, it should recognize that it does so in a context where the international
 law is less definitive and more open to interpretation.14
 Whether or not one agrees with this more restrictive definition of
 human rights, the important point here is that such discussion rein
 forces the argument that imprisonment and torture are qualitatively
 different activities. Regimes choose different mixes of these methods of
 political control, a variation that is masked by a one-dimensional scale.
 For governments or their agents considering violating human rights,
 the choice of one activity in addition to or over another will depend, in
 part, on their calculation of the costs and benefits. The costs refer not
 just to the deployment of their own resources but to the possibility of
 externally imposed costs, such as international sanctions. These costs
 will likely vary with the normative differences in the activities. The use
 of torture and killing carries the likelihood of higher external costs, and
 governments implicitly recognize this when they opt, for example, for
 "disappearing" victims rather than killing them. Furthermore, there
 may be different "benefits" attached to the use of torture or imprison
 ment. The agents themselves, police or soldiers, may derive more spe
 cific benefits?from sadistic pleasure to direct monetary gain?from the
 choice of one type of repression over another. In this policy area, as with
 any other, implementation is a critical stage, such that the narrower aims
 or purposes of those charged with implementation may deserve sepa
 rate theoretical consideration. We must recognize the possibility of
 what might be called "entrepreneurial repression," where police forces
 act independently to use their coercive powers corruptly in their per
 sonal interest.15
 13 Kausikan, "Asia's Different Standard," Foreign Policy 92 (Fall 1993), 32.
 14 Ibid., 39-40.
 15 One analysis of the use of torture by police in India argues that because they have low status and
 low pay "as with many other Indian officials they feel driven to supplement their incomes. The de
 tainees themselves, or their families, are threatened with torture if they do not bribe the police?a
 threat that can work only if those who do not pay, or cannot pay, are in fact tortured." See David J.
 Rothman and Aryeh Neier, "India's Awful Prisons," New York Review of Books (May 16,1991), 54.
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 If regimes see these practices as less or more acceptable, as argued by
 Kausikan, and frame their choices accordingly, then efforts to explain
 (and change) these practices will have to take these differences into ac
 count. Further, insofar as political scientists aim to generate knowledge
 that is useful to "governments, international organizations, and sub na
 tional actors . . . interested in improving respect for personal integrity
 around the world,"16 they will have to be sensitive to the different types
 of activity, the different meanings attached to them in different con
 texts, and the nature of the political challenge.
 Composite Indices and Human Rights Violations
 Beyond the normative and methodological arguments for separating
 umbrella concepts, like human rights violations, into their important
 components, there are conceptual and empirical arguments that center
 on measurement clarity, ease of interpretation, and loss of information.
 Because we had collected and coded data for 1984 and 1987 from one
 of the same sources {Amnesty International Reports) that Poe and T?te
 used in their larger analysis and because they have generously provided
 their data, we can undertake several different kinds of tests to compare
 the two approaches for this same data source and across the same coun
 tries at the same time.
 Let us first describe each coding scheme briefly. For their human
 rights measure, Poe and T?te used a composite index composed of a
 five-point ordinal scale, based on Freedom House's coding rules.17 A
 score of 1 was a country "under a secure rule of law, people are not im
 prisoned ..., and torture is rare or exceptional." By contrast, a score of
 5 is a country where "the terrors of [level 4] have been expanded to the
 whole population." For our human rights measure, we developed two
 indices for each country, one based on the degree of arbitrary impris
 onment and the other based upon the systematic use of killings and
 torture of prisoners.18 Each index ranged from 0, where a country had
 no violations on that dimension, to 4, where a country had frequent vi
 olations.19
 Although the Poe and T?te index was developed with a good level of
 intercoder reliability, there remain more fundamental problems in in
 terpreting its meaning. We can begin by examining the definitional
 16PoeandTate(fn.2),867.
 17 Ibid., 867-68.
 18 See Mitchell and McCormick (fn. 1), 483-85.
 19 Quantitative levels were employed to make this gradation. See Mitchell and McCormick (fn. 1),
 485 n. 17.
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 construction of the index. Table 1 separates out the two major dimen
 sions that are mixed in Poe and T?te s composite measure and identi
 fies the key words in the coding rules that describe the level of activity
 on each dimension. Note first that for the imprisonment dimension the
 level of activity has to increase with each rank, whereas for the torture
 and killing dimension the level of activity is about the same for coun
 tries scoring a 1 or a 2, and quite possibly for countries scoring a 3 with
 the use of the conditional phrase ("may be common"). Only with coun
 tries ranked 4 or 5 could one be sure that torture and killing is greater
 than "rare." But at these ranks the distinctions concerning imprison
 ment ("more than extensive," and the "whole population") become
 more blurred. Further, as defined, the approach does not exhaust all the
 logical possibilities.20 Although the missing possibilities are quite rare,
 there is no ranking for instances where governments or their security
 forces have a "take no prisoners" strategy: that is, cases where impris
 onment rates are relatively low (less than extensive) but where torture
 and killing are widespread.21
 In effect, the composite scale is more likely to capture the incidence
 of imprisonment better than the incidence of torture and killing at the
 lowest values of the scale; and it is more likely to capture the incidence
 of torture and killing better than the incidence of imprisonment at the
 highest values. As the two dimensions are not equally represented at
 each value on the composite scale, there is no reason to expect that they
 would be equally represented in any overall sense. By mixing the dimen
 sions in this way, we lose considerable information about the global con
 dition of human rights and can conceivably misconstrue the conditions
 within individual countries. Analytically, we lose the possibility of ex
 amining the choice strategies, the logic behind them, and the degree of
 complementarity between these separate methods of political control.
 To this point the discussion has been definitional and conceptual,
 rather than empirical. Yet it is nevertheless interesting to examine how
 the logic of the composite scale manifests itself empirically, and how
 the separate dimensions are confounded in the composite scale. A sim
 ple correlational analysis of the prisoner and torture scales for 1984 and
 1987 and the composite index illustrates that while, as one would ex
 20 For a discussion of the logical criteria of classification, see Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of
 Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," World Politics
 19 (October 1966).
 21 It is not simply genocidal regimes such as that in Nazi Germany or in Cambodia under Pol Pot
 that might aim for this combination of human rights violations. Take, for example, Amnesty Interna
 tional's description of human rights violations in the Philippines in its 1988 report. Descriptions focus
 almost entirely on extensive killings and disappearances, not on imprisonment of political dissidents.
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 Table 1
 The Possible Dimensions of Poe and Tate's Unidimensional
 Human Rights Measure
 Scale Political Imprisonment Torture/Killing
 1 none exceptional/extremely rare
 2 limited exceptional/rare
 3 extensive may be common
 4 more than extensive common
 5 whole population whole population
 pect, all these scales are related, they are by no means identical. For the
 prison and torture scales for 1984 and 1987, the correlations were .60
 and .64, respectively. The composite index is somewhat more closely
 associated with torture (.70 and .73 in 1984 and 1987, respectively)
 than imprisonment (.56 and .63).22 What these summary statistics can
 not help us with, however, is the question of the locus of the particular
 mixes of imprisonment and torture on the composite scale, and the
 modeling implications of mixing the measurements of imprisonment
 and torture decisions for a set of independent variables. It is to these is
 sues that we now turn.
 First, is it the case, as our analysis of the composite scale's coding
 scheme suggests, that for these data imprisonment is "captured" better
 at the lower end of the composite scale than is torture? A simple cross
 tabular display is the most direct way to address this question. Figure 1
 shows the percentage of cases (countries) that fall on the diagonal when
 the composite scale (1-5) is cross-tabulated with the prisoner and tor
 ture scales (0-4 for each). If, as expected, different specific values of the
 composite scale reflect different mixes of imprisonment and torture,
 then we expect variation between the imprisonment and torture scales
 in the proportion of cases that fall on the diagonal for the values of the
 composite scale. We should see greater agreement between the com
 posite scale and the imprisonment scale (as opposed to the torture
 scale) at the lower values. Conversely, we should see greater agreement
 between the composite scale and the torture scale (as opposed to the
 imprisonment scale) at the higher values.
 These expectations are generally borne out in Figure 1. The top por
 tion of the figure shows quite vividly that the imprisonment scale is
 most closely associated with the composite scale at the two lowest val
 22 There were 115 cases to analyze for 1984 and 125 cases for 1987. For each year, there were a small
 number of cases that Poe and T?te did not include because they lacked data on one or more of the in
 dependent variables they were analyzing.
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 Figure 1
 Cross-Tabulation of Poe and Tate's Composite
 Human Rights Index with Mitchell and McCormick's
 Prisoner Index and Torture Index
 (1984,1987)
 aThe first entry is the percentage of correspondence between the rankings of countries
 on the two scales for the 1984 data, while the second entry is the degree of correspon
 dence for the 1987 data.
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 ues. These results are largely the opposite for the torture scale. The tor
 ture scale rather than the imprisonment scale is more closely associated
 with the composite index at the higher values. The relatively high cor
 respondence between the torture scale category 1 and the composite
 scale category 2 is understandable. This represents a clear point of def
 initional correspondence between the two scales. Recall that the torture
 dimension on the first two, and possibly even three, categories of the
 composite scale is defined as "exceptional/rare." Only category 1 on the
 torture scale is defined in this way?" 'rarely' referred to countries in
 which one to ten cases of political prisoners or incidents of torture or
 killing were reported by Amnesty International."23
 A second way to assess the impact of the separate dimensions on the
 composite scale is to regress this scale on both the prisoner and torture
 scales. This approach is comparable to Kenneth Bollens use of regres
 sion analysis to disentangle the components of measures of democ
 racy.24 Table 2 shows those results for 1984 and 1987.25The torture and
 killing scale is the more powerful influence. Indeed, as the beta weights
 indicate in both equations, the torture scale is about twice as large as
 the prisoner scale, indicating the importance of that measure in pre
 dicting the ranking of a country on the composite scale. Both equations
 have reasonably large amounts of explained variances (50 percent or
 more in both cases), and the results are consistent across the two dif
 ferent years, providing additional confidence in our analyses.26
 Yet a third way to assess the relative merits of the composite scales
 and the separate prisoner and torture scales would be to regress each on
 a common set of independent variables. If these dependent variables are
 capturing the same underlying process, we should expect to find sub
 stantial overlap in the number of significant variables with each of the
 different dependent variables. If we find differences between the com
 posite scale and the prisoner and torture scales and, in turn, between
 23 Mitchell and McCormick (fn. 1), 485 n. 17.
 24 Kenneth A. Bollen, "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Democracy," American Sociolog
 ical Review AS (June 1980).
 25 We also ran a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test of normality for the dependent variable, the compos
 ite scale, for 1984 and 1987. In both instances, the scale was not normally distributed and thus some
 caution must accompany the interpretation of our regression results. Because we are working with a
 population of data and because we are employing a series of other tests, we believe that it is useful to
 report the regression results to obtain an overall portrait of the relationship among the three human
 rights scales.
 26 As a further check on our analysis, we employed a discriminant analysis using the prisoner scale
 and the torture scale in separate runs as predictors of the placement of countries on the composite
 scale. In general, the results imply that both the prisoner and torture scales are more predictive of val
 ues at the high and low ends of the composite scale. While these results are not wholly consistent with
 our other analyses, they do suggest some distinctive emphases within the composite scale.
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 Table 2
 Regression Analysis of Poe and Tate's Composite Index on
 Mitchell and McCormick's Prisoner and Torture Indices51
 _(1984 and 1987)_
 1984 1987
 Reg.Coeff. Beta Weight Reg. Coeff Beta Weight
 Prisoner index .20* .23 .22* .25
 (.07) (.07)
 Torture index .40* .56 .42* .56
 (.06) (.06)
 Adjusted R-squared .51 .56
 N_115_125_
 'Significant at the .01 level
 'The standard errors of the regression coefficients are in parenthesis.
 the prisoner and torture scales, such results add further credence to dis
 aggregating this umbrella concept because different factors seemingly
 account for its various components.
 Fortunately, we can undertake this comparison, since the two years
 for which the prisoner and torture scales are available overlap with two
 of the eight years in the Poe and T?te analyses. Because the Poe and
 T?te dependent and independent variables have been made available to
 researchers,27 we can calculate comparable regression models for 1984
 and 1987 with the only difference being in the choice of the dependent
 variable. (Unfortunately, we cannot carry out the pooled, cross-sectional,
 time-series analyses originally reported by Poe and T?te because the
 Mitchell and McCormick measure does not exist for the other six years.)
 In order to do these analyses, however, we still had to make several
 important research decisions to maximize comparability. First, as noted
 earlier, we selected only those countries that were coded in both the Poe
 and T?te and the Mitchell and McCormick dataseis. This gave us 115
 countries for 1984 and 125 countries for 1987. Second, we used only
 the Amnesty International measure from the Poe and T?te data, since
 Amnesty International was also the data source for the one developed
 by Mitchell and McCormick. Third, for the democracy measure in the
 regression equations we relied upon the Vanhanen index, rather than
 the Freedom House measure (Poe and T?te report results for both),
 since Poe and T?te acknowledge that some overlap exists between the
 27 The data are available through the following website: http://www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/. For ease of
 analysis, we truncated some of Poe and T?te s independent variables to two decimal places. Such a de
 sign decision should not affect the interpretations offered here.
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 Freedom House measure and the dependent variable.28 By making
 these analytic decisions, we enhance the degree of comparison between
 the two approaches and thus focus attention principally on the role of
 the differing dependent variables.
 On a cautionary note, this third test is based not only on the charac
 teristics of the different human rights scales but also on the quality of
 the set of independent variables already in the model. Thus, if the in
 dependent variables are weak or poorly specified or measured, we can
 not have much confidence in conclusions drawn from the differences or
 similarities across the various measures of the dependent variable.29
 Furthermore, we should add that these results are not definitive on the
 role of these variables in accounting for human rights violations; rather,
 they are illustrative of the differing results one obtains for some previ
 ously used predictor variables when employing alternative measures of
 human rights violations. Finally, an additional complicating factor, of
 course, is that we are employing ordinary least squares regression for
 this test with dependent variables that are ordinal, not interval.
 The coefficients for these regression analyses with the differing de
 pendent variables are reported in Table 3. In their pooled analysis, Poe
 and T?te find four of their ten variables significantly related to their
 composite measure: civil war, international war, democracy, and popu
 lation size. There is little overlap in the variables that are significant
 with the composite scale and the separate prison and torture indices.
 Across the six equations, only the civil war variable appears important
 in affecting violations of human rights, regardless of the dependent
 variable chosen (excepting the prison index, 1987). Besides civil war,
 the only other variable that produces any consistency across the mea
 sures is the logged population variable, a measure simply connoting
 that the size of a country affects the magnitude of human rights viola
 tions. (Because Amnesty International's reporting procedure does not
 take into account the population size of countries, analysts must control
 28 On this point, see Poe and T?te (fn. 2), 856-57.
 29 Poe and T?te operationalize their influential civil war variable in terms of number of deaths, the
 government "involved as a direct participant in the war," and the assumption that "there must be ef
 fective resistance" on the nongovernment side. This may provide them a distinction between genocide
 and civil war, as they assert, but it does not permit the confident assertion that civil war as a "concept
 is kept distinct from our dependent variable"; Poe and T?te (fn. 2), 859. There is likely considerable
 circularity between the measurement of civil war and the measure of government "repression of human
 rights to personal integrity," particularly at the high end (values 4 and 5 of the dependent variable).
 Thus, the interpretation of the relationship between the civil war variable and the dependent variable
 should be treated carefully.
 Finally, we should note that while Table 4 reports a significant relationship for leftist government
 control and the unidimensional measure of human rights violations for 1984, the coefficient has the
 wrong sign, as it had in Poe and Tares pooled analysis; Poe and T?te (fn. 2), 861.
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 Table 3
 Regression Coefficients3 for Poe and Tate's Independent Variables11
 with Three Human Rights Measures
 (1984,1987)
 Poe and T?te
 Composite Scale
 Mitchell and McCorm ick
 Prison Index  Torture Index
 1984  1987  1984  1987  1984  1987
 Economic
 PCGINC
 PCGNP
 Political
 VANHDEMO
 LEFT
 MILCTR2
 Cultural
 BRITINFL
 War
 CWAR
 IWAR
 Population
 LPOP
 POPINC
 Adjusted
 R-squared
 N
 .004
 (.004)
 -.064**
 (.021)
 -.014
 (.009)
 -.416*
 (.206)
 .110
 (.182)
 -.394*
 (.164)
 .987**
 (.246)
 .977**
 (.275)
 .090
 (.048)
 .049
 (.057)
 .39
 115
 .0008
 (.003)
 -.038*
 (.018)
 -.011
 (.009)
 .127
 (.216)
 -.072
 (.177)
 -.339*
 (.169)
 1.143**
 (.235)
 .801**
 (.288)
 .137**
 (.047)
 .053
 (.056)
 .38
 125
 .012**
 (.005)
 -.019
 (.025)
 -.022*
 (.010)
 .329
 (.238)
 -.100
 (.210)
 -.388*
 (.190)
 .903**
 (.285)
 .987**
 (.318)
 .108*
 (.055)
 .132*
 (.066)
 .36
 115
 .002
 (.003)
 -.034
 (.023)
 -.022
 (.012)
 .277
 (.276)
 .255
 (.226)
 -.090
 (.215)
 .089
 (.300)
 .733*
 (.368)
 .231**
 (.060)
 .017
 (.071)
 .25
 125
 .004
 (.006)
 -.032
 (.034)
 -.028*
 (.014)
 -.289
 (.326)
 -.009
 (.288)
 -.017
 (.260)
 1.037**
 (.390)
 .564
 (.435)
 .203**
 (.075)
 .174
 (.090)
 .22
 115
 .0005
 (.004)
 -.053*
 (.027)
 -.021
 (.014)
 -.116
 (.316)
 -.011
 (.259)
 -.249
 (.247)
 .814*
 (.344)
 .372
 (.422)
 .316**
 (.069)
 -.027
 (.082)
 .27
 125
 'Significant at the .05 level
 "Significant at the .01 level
 SOURCES: Data and variable definitions were provided by Steven Poe and C. NealTate at their Inter
 national Human Rights Center site on the world wide web (http://www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/).
 aThe entries are unstandardized regression coefficients for the six different regression equations
 using different operationalizations of the dependent variable. The standard errors of the regression
 coefficients are in parenthesis.
 bThe variables are defined as follows:
 PCGINC=yearly percentage increase in GNP per capita
 PCGNP=corrected GNP per capita (in 1000s)
 VANHDEMO=Vanhanen Democratization Score
 LEFT=Leftist Regime Dummy Variable
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 Table 3 (cont.)
 MILCTR2=Dichotomous Military Control Variable
 BRITlNFL=British Government Influence Dummy Variable
 CWAR=Civil War Dummy Variable
 IWAR=International War Dummy Variable
 LPOP=Logged Population Variable
 POPINC= Yearly Percentage Increase in Population, 1980-87
 for this factor.) For ease of presentation, we have grouped the other
 variables into the political, economic, and cultural categories and find
 that only scattered commonalities occur across these different measures.
 Thus, for example, per capita income and British influence are signifi
 cant for the composite scale but the former is only significant for the
 torture index in 1987 and the latter for the prison index in 1984. Al
 though democracy is an important factor in their eight-year analysis, it
 has little impact on the Poe and T?te measure for the years in this analy
 sis. It is, however, important for the prison and torture analyses for 1984.
 The results seem to suggest a substantial difference between the pre
 dictor variables and the Poe and T?te dependent measure and Mitchell
 and McCormick measures (taken as a group), but are the predictors
 sufficiendy different for the separate indices to warrant the use of the
 prisoner/torture distinction? Here the results provide some support for
 our contention that imprisonment and killing are distinct strategies
 that produce some scattered contrasts in significance and direction of
 the relationships. Focusing on the war variables, civil war is generally
 significant for the imprisonment and torture scales, but some differ
 ences between the imprisonment and torture and killing scales emerge
 for international war. For three of the independent variables (LEFT,
 MILCTR2, and POPINC), the direction of the relationship changes for the
 differing dependent measures. For the other variables, there are differ
 ences in the size of the coefficients across the different measures of the
 dependent variables, and some prove statistically significant.30
 30 We computed t-tests for the differences between the unstandardized coefficients (assuming inde
 pendence) for each model with the other two (that is, the composite model with the prison model, the
 composite model with the torture model, and the prison model with the torture model) for each year.
 For the 1984 data, three differences were significant: the coefficients for the LEFT variable for the com
 posite and prison measures were significantly different from one another at the .05 level, the coeffi
 cients for the LPOP variable with the composite and torture measures were significantly different at the
 .10 level, and the coefficients for the LEFT variable with the prison and torture models were signifi
 candy different at the .10 level. For the 1987 data, three were significant as well: the coefficients for the
 CWAR variable for the composite and prison models (.01), the coefficients for the LPOP variable for the
 composite and torture models (.01), and the coefficients for the LEFT variable for the prison and tor
 ture models (.10).
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 Finally, we should note that the comparison of the performance of
 the dependent variables is only as strong as the theoretical justification
 and operationalization of the independent variables.31 But even this last
 and most contingent empirical analysis provides some support for the
 direct comparisons of the dependent variables, suggesting that the con
 tent of human rights violations and the different approaches to mea
 suring this content have important implications for social science
 modeling as well as for victims.
 Conclusions
 Human rights violations is an important but complicated concept, and
 we recognize that we are dealing with only a portion of it in this analy
 sis. In international law, for example, human rights extends to eco
 nomic and social rights, while also including the "integrity of the
 person," the focus of this research. Further, there is no universal agree
 ment regarding the integrity of the person?as witnessed by the East
 West debate alluded to earlier and the continuing philosophical and
 normative controversy over human rights generally. To be sure, social
 scientists have contributed to the explication of the concept and devel
 oped a variety of quantitative indicators designed to measure it cross
 nationally. While all such indicators can only approximate reality, we
 have argued on normative, conceptual, and analytical grounds that fur
 ther progress lies in separating the human rights concept into its impor
 tant components. The normative problem is the failure to discriminate
 morally between alternative strategies of repression (the use of impris
 Following Carmines and Zeller, we also computed a series of bivariate correlations for the indepen
 dent variables with each of the dependent measures as another way to test the differences among the
 various models. See Edward G. Carmines and Richard A. Zeller, Reliability and Validity Assessment
 (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), 17-27,66-70, esp. 68. To evaluate the differences for
 each of these bivariate relationships, we compared the unstandardized coefficients (assuming indepen
 dence) from the three bivariate regression models for each variable. Comparable results obtained, with
 the exceptions that the VANHDEMO variable in 1984 was now significant at the .10 level for the com
 posite model and the prison model comparison and for the composite model and torture model com
 parison, and that the LPOP variable comparison was now not significant in 1984. For 1987 CWAR is
 now significant for the composite model and prison model at .05 level (instead of .01), and CWAR is
 now significant for the prison and torture model comparison at the .10 level. LPOP for the composite
 model and torture model comparison is now significant at the .10 level (instead of .01) in 1987.
 31 See Carmines and Zeller (fn. 30), 26. Also, as Poe and T?te (fn. 2) point out, "The development
 of theories to explain ... such crimes ... would seem to be a vital undertaking, [yet] social science
 scholars have only begun to use the newly developed information toward this end" (p. 853). Unfortu
 nately, assessing the construct validity of a concept uis, by necessity theory-laden. ... In a very real
 sense, whenever one assesses the construct validity of the measure of interest, one is also evaluating si
 multaneously the construct validity of measures of the other theoretical concepts"; Carmines and
 Zeller (fn. 30), 23-25.
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 onment versus the use of torture and killing). The conceptual problem is
 the failure to appreciate fiilly the value of disaggregation, an established
 principle of social science methodology and a design decision critical to
 the development of social science methodology.
 The various empirical analyses presented here support the method
 ological and theoretical arguments for disaggregation. In practice, the
 unidimensional scale, while designed to represent both the major di
 mensions of human rights violations, does so in a way that is difficult to
 interpret. Both imprisonment and torture are methods of political con
 trol that are important in themselves, and research efforts ought to be
 geared to maximizing information gains about both of these activities.
 Using separate indices seems a more appropriate means for moving in
 that direction.
 The work of social scientists in a related area also makes a com
 pelling and persuasive case for disaggregation. Those interested in gen
 erating useful knowledge on individual crimes, rather than state crimes,
 do not employ a one-dimensional crime scale that combines nonviolent
 and violent crimes. They disaggregate shoplifting from rape and seek
 explanations for these substantively different types of criminal activity.
 To draw out the parallel, one would think that disaggregating state
 crimes would be a rudimentary and a relatively uncontroversial research
 design decision as well. Indeed, only when we have done the job of "ex
 hausting [human rights violations] of [their] analytical components"32
 can we be confident of making the most of our analytic opportunities.
 Finally, and importantly, as analysts have increasingly moved toward
 understanding human rights violations as a policy choice?that gov
 ernments have alternatives in how much and what type of human
 rights to violate?then disaggregating the types of violations into their
 key components has become even more important. In this sense, the
 prospects for theoretical breakthrough seem greater through disaggre
 gation than through reliance on a composite scale that masks impor
 tant underlying components of the human rights concept.
 32 Vallier (fn. 6), 223.
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